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Introduction 
At the heart of the High Court’s 1998 decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting 
Authority,2 concerning a trans-Tasman stoush over the validity of broadcasting standards, was 
a conspicuous emphasis on specific legislative context and purpose.  The Court was focused 
on the legal consequences of a particular executive procedural failure, yet it might be argued 
more broadly that this decision effectively picked a winner in the lingering contests over the 
true source and shape of administrative legality.  The strong focus on statutory specifics 
appeared to set in motion a steady conceptual shift away from external or ‘pre-mixed’ 
standards drawn from common law archives of principles and presumptions.  At the very least, 
it can be acknowledged that Project Blue Sky exerted a strong ‘centripetal force’ in Australian 
administrative law3 – drawing it inwards towards statutory detail and context.   
To borrow a term used by some fine international and Australian jurists,4 this article is an 
exercise in ‘top-down’ analysis of some key trends in Australian administrative law.  It will re-
examine the ‘Blue Sky effect’ from above: its permeation through judicial review principles; its 
contemporary significance; and its place in the broader dynamics of our public law.  Top down 
thinking comes with some risk, as would be noted by that statistician who drowned in a lake 
of average depth two feet.  However, the impractical top-down perspective can be a useful 
thread in the conversation, and such analysis is in this instance prompted by what would 
appear to have been some recent top-down reasoning by the High Court itself. 
Ultimately, one purpose of this article is to redirect the wandering but tenacious debate 
between the ‘statutor-ist’ and ‘common law-ist’ views of judicial review.  This debate 
manifested itself most prominently in historical arguments between ‘ultra vires theorists’ 
(focused on statutory boundaries) and ‘common law theorists’ (focused on deeper conceptual 
legal roots),5 and of course in the formative Australian debate particularly in the natural justice 
context between Justices Mason and Brennan in the 1980s.6  As will be seen, the latter (at 
least) would seem to have been settled as a theoretically unproductive draw.  Yet the 
underlying patterns in Australian legal development have a real and ongoing practical 
significance.  To jump forward in the analysis (and even putting aside the obvious dilemma of 
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what is to be done in review of non-statutory powers), does a Federal Court judge today still 
reach for the pre-mixed categories of jurisdictional error enshrined in Craig v South Australia7 
or to a more internal, statute-specific formulation of the concept?  Does a state Supreme Court 
judge still draw from Wednesbury8 to explain and apply the standard of ‘unreasonableness’, 
or does that standard now come from specific statutory context?  Is there still anything 
resembling a single standard of bias?  Or bad faith? Or fraud?  It appears that there has been 
an incremental ‘repatriation’ of the judicial review grounds – so carefully lined up for 
contemporary times by the ADJR Act9 framework - such that perhaps any remaining 
freestanding standards are now to be carefully calibrated to specific statutory context.    
The emergent concept of ‘materiality’ in jurisdictional error doctrine, namely the idea that 
inconsequential errors ordinarily will not qualify,10 is a part of this story.  First, this development 
is ostensibly on the Blue Sky trajectory given that the requirement has been explained as a 
product of statutory construction (with the precise standard possibly adjusted by specific 
statute).11  Secondly, just as a matter of logistics, this idea appears to have travelled from the 
complex evolutions of the fair hearing rule to the concept of jurisdictional error via the stepping 
stone of Blue Sky procedural error.12  This article is not a full discussion and critique of the 
‘materiality’ phenomenon in jurisdictional error – that work is being ably progressed by other 
writers.13  Yet the history and context of this development can be traced, and is important to 
our understanding of current and future directions.           
The Blue Sky effect, then, has a broad reach and ostensibly a very contemporary importance.  
However, it is certainly not proposed here that we return to the old debates between ‘statutor-
ists’ and the ‘common law-ists’.  The common law theory has met with visible defeats, and the 
statutory theory is unsettled by the fact that analysis reveals there have been varying drivers 
for the courts’ deeper excavation of statutory intentions, and some conspicuous diversions 
from the course.  It might seem that the old debate is best left as a dignified draw, lest it distract 
us from a fuller analysis of the complex dilemmas and practical evolutions in modern 
Australian administrative law.  The contention here is that it is more productive to recognise 
the repatriation of grounds and closer statutory focus as part of a bigger dynamic – namely a 
two-stage search for flexibility in judicial review principles, in response to broad changes in 
regulatory context, legislative drafting, public expectations, litigation strategy and indeed 
executive realities.  As will be seen the ‘materiality’ overlay, in the test for jurisdictional error, 
would seem to confirm the presence of this broader dynamic (and perhaps the elasticity of the 
Blue Sky methodological banner).  This search for flexibility certainly builds agility in our 
judicial review principles, but it can be somewhat confounding at times - and would appear to 
come at some cost.        
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The ‘Blue Sky effect’ – calibration to statutory context 
In Project Blue Sky,14 the High Court formally rejected the old (and sometimes pre-emptive) 
labelling of explicit executive procedural obligations as ‘mandatory’ or ‘directory’.  According 
to McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, the old classifications had drawn attention away 
from the real task of determining whether an act done in breach of a relevant legislative 
provision was valid: “[the] classification of a statutory provision as mandatory or directory 
records a result which has been reached on other grounds…[the] classification is the end of 
the inquiry, not the beginning.”15  It was declared that “a better test for determining the issue 
of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of 
the provision should be invalid”.16  The legislative purpose in this regard was to be broadly 
ascertained by reference to factors such as statutory language, subject matter and the 
consequences of invalidity.17   
This decision was thematically important in the evolution of Australian administrative law.  As 
will be seen the embedded search for ‘essential preconditions’ helped to shape the gradually 
emerging touchstone for jurisdictional error, and indeed this approach to identifying procedural 
preconditions informed the courts’ simultaneous tussles with the identification of ‘jurisdictional 
facts’.18  Yet more broadly, as alluded to above, Project Blue Sky gave momentum and 
prominence to a strengthening explicit focus on specific statutory purpose and context in the 
Australian principles, and seemed to reflect a broader commitment to clear away older generic 
ideas and standards that may have become somewhat redundant.  As will be seen this trend 
can be readily (but awkwardly) traced through the recent history of ‘jurisdictional error’, and as 
noted above its early footprint (and accompanying debate) is quite conspicuous in formative 
natural justice cases.  Yet close examination reveals the broader reach of this ‘Blue Sky effect’ 
across a range of judicial review principles.  There is evidence of an ongoing repatriation of 
judicial review grounds, in a sense returning the remaining outlying or ‘freestanding’ standards 
of administrative legality to the corral of grounds that have always been calibrated to statutory 
context.  The most prominent example is the ground of ‘unreasonableness’, however similar 
thinking can be found in the context of ‘bias’, ‘bad faith’ and ‘fraud’.  And this lens allows us to 
spot some other examples of actual or attempted repatriation in the context of the principles 
relating (for example) to delegation and behest (or ‘dictation’).   
Jurisdictional error  
The Blue Sky attention to the gravity of particular procedural errors, and consequent distinction 
between unlawfulness and invalidity, saw the case having a natural and important influence 
on the broader principles of jurisdictional error – which of course rests on a similarly poised 
assessment of the seriousness of error.19  Unsurprisingly the emerging focus on statutory 
specifics, and indeed some tension with older methodologies, is clearly on display in the recent 
history of ‘jurisdictional error’.   
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Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth20 ushered in the modern thinking on the nature and 
function of jurisdictional error in Australia.  Most clearly for present purposes, the High Court 
re-examined the old ‘pre-mixed’ Hickman formula for the handling of privative clauses21  and 
determined (or re-affirmed) that Hickman was essentially nothing more than an aid to 
construction; a tool that might assist the court in reconciling provisions which both define 
powers and seemingly then free them from restriction.22  The constitutional backdrop was 
significant in the Plaintiff S157 reasoning, but at a more basic level so too was the concern to 
dismantle external standards that might distract from an examination of specific statutory 
context and purpose. 
Beyond this relegation of Hickman, the reasoning of the judges in Plaintiff S157 reflected some 
clear convergence of the search for ‘essential’ limitations in the specific statute and the notion 
of jurisdictional error.23 Yet it is was at this point incomplete given the lingering presence of 
external tools for the identification of jurisdictional error; namely the formulas from Craig v 
South Australia24 and precedents on the likely status of certain types of error.  The joint 
majority in Plaintiff S157, having pressed the idea of a ‘reconciliation’ of provisions to 
determine whether some failure constitutes a jurisdictional error (thus outside the privative 
clause’s protection), ultimately quickly classified a breach of natural justice as such an error 
simply based on earlier precedent.25  Gleeson CJ proceeded further on the path – apparently 
resisting presumptions and remaining focused on an internal assessment as he emphasised 
that the status of a natural justice breach depended on a construction of the statute as a whole 
(albeit concluding here that it was a breach of an indispensable condition).26  The Court in the 
critical state sequel – Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW)27 - also appeared to waver 
between the internal (statute-specific) and external (pre-mixed) conceptualisations of 
jurisdictional error.  The joint majority emphasised that there was no ‘bright line test’, and that 
the Craig formulas were not a rigid taxonomy but only examples, yet ultimately did identify 
jurisdictional errors in the case with close reference to Craig categories.28 
In recent decisions the ‘internal’ approach to jurisdictional error (based on the notion of 
essential ‘preconditions’ and ‘conditions’ under the particular statute) has gained some 
ascendancy – notably in the decision of Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection.29  And the maturing focus on statutory context and purpose can be found 
elsewhere in the contemporary handling of privative clauses.  For example, Probuild 
Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd30 confirmed that permissible ouster (eg 
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of certiorari for ‘error of law on the face of the record’) need not be by way of an express 
privative clause – but can be drawn from the Act as a whole (ie text, context and purpose).31              
Unreasonableness 
Another important ‘repatriation’ of Australian principle is found in the context of the ground of 
‘unreasonableness’.  The 2013 decision of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li,32 
concerned a refusal by the former Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to exercise its power to 
adjourn review proceedings33 pending a second skills assessment of the visa applicant by the 
relevant authority (which was itself delayed by internal review).  An obvious natural justice 
challenge was difficult owing to there being an ‘exhaustive statement’ provision attached to 
the express procedural obligations.34  There were some carefully argued attempts to evade 
this difficulty, but Justices Hayne, Kiefel and Bell ultimately focused instead on the ground of 
unreasonableness35 (which they considered was not displaced by the statutory terms).36  
Importantly, close analysis reveals that their Honours seemed eager to keep this ground of 
review close to statutory context.37  Most directly, their Honours stated at one point that ‘[the] 
legal standard of reasonableness must be the standard indicated by the true construction of 
the statute’.38  They emphasised the formulation of the ground from the 1970s Tameside 
Council case (‘no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its responsibilities’ would 
have so decided the matter),39 which arguably better accommodates the focus on statutory 
context than the traditional Wednesbury formulation (a decision must be ‘so unreasonable that 
no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’).40  The latter was noted to have been 
criticised for some ‘circularity and vagueness’.41  Their Honours also emphasised that 
unreasonableness might be inferred from the facts and the matters falling for consideration in 
the exercise of a particular power: ie inferred where the decision viewed in that context ‘lacks 
an evident and intelligible justification’.42 
The idea that the actual standard of ‘reasonableness’ to be applied is calibrated to statutory 
context43 is potentially a significant advance on the more obvious (and more conventional) 
point that the assessment of ‘reasonableness’ will take account of statutory context.  This may 
have been prompted, in part, by this use of the ground in a space generally occupied by natural 
justice – a ground very much calibrated to statutory context.  Or perhaps this additional tuning 
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to statute was a natural extension of a growing (on trend44) emphasis on the idea that ‘the 
legislature is taken to intend that a discretionary power, statutorily conferred, will be exercised 
reasonably’.45  Yet the need for such fine tuning might be arguable, even on that basis, given 
that the limitation presumed to have been intended by the legislature might simply (and 
perhaps more logically) be the standard established by the traditional ‘unreasonableness’ 
cases.   
The recent decision of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW 46 concerned 
a Li-style challenge to the former Refugee Review Tribunal’s lack of action to facilitate the 
appearance of the protection visa applicant.  The High Court, albeit primarily focused on the 
nature of the appellate court’s role in such a case, rejected the unreasonableness challenge.47  
While the difficulty of precisely defining this ground was noted at various points, the broadly 
facilitative ‘lack of evident or intelligible justification’ formulation was emphasised again,48 as 
was the traditional stringency of the test.49  More relevantly for present purposes, the 
‘presumed legislative intention’ approach to the ground continued to grow in prominence.50  
The relevance of statutory context to the assessment was certainly noted at various points,51 
and the variable standard idea raised in Li was (at the very least) nudged along.  Gageler J’s 
approach appeared to rest (again) on a ‘default’ standard that might be varied by the specific 
statute.52  Gordon and Nettle JJ ultimately appeared to offer a middle position: ‘[the] standard 
of reasonableness is derived from the applicable statute but also from the general law’.53  
Edelman J appeared to settle on the proposition that the ‘content’ of the reasonableness test 
is ‘assessed in light of the terms, scope, purpose, and object of the statute’.54 Their Honours’ 
ensuing analysis, and indeed the analysis in the short succeeding decision of TTY167 v 
Republic of Nauru,55 reveals that there might be a fine line between context-driven 
assessment and a context-driven standard.  However, as discussed below, there is an 
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underlying pattern here that is important to the ongoing predictability and normative influence56 
of administrative law in Australia.   
Bias, bad faith and fraud 
At the sharper end of administrative error, there have long been some ostensibly free-standing 
standards in operation.  Yet in recent years, there have been signs that these might be similarly 
drawn into the ‘repatriation’ of grounds process.  In the context of bias, it is of course well 
known that a ‘spectrum’ of standards approach has been keenly deployed to accommodate 
the great range of decision-making contexts in which bias challenges might arise.57  This 
approach appears to have crystallised in the context of Ministerial actions in the migration 
context in the late 1990s / early 2000s – where close attention was paid to the nature of the 
decision-making process and the identity of the decision-maker.58  This thinking was quickly 
also applied to tribunal members59 and has since been applied in various other contexts.60  
The High Court broadly re-affirmed this sensitivity to different decision-making contexts in the 
2015 decision of Isbester v Knox City Council.61  Beyond this, however, there have been hints 
of a more granular examination of statutory context in the formulation of bias standards.  A 
reasonably prominent example is found in a 2012 Federal Court examination of decision-
makers’ use of ‘cut and pasted’ reasons (or ‘templates’) in multiple matters, and the 
implications as regards both the fair hearing and bias rules.62  It was noted that a bias 
challenge might be difficult to make out in this context as the court weighs contextual factors 
such as decision-making volume and repetition, the nature of the claims and decisions in 
question, the kind and degree of neutrality required, and the precise nature of the similarity 
between successive decisions.63  
In the context of ‘bad faith’ an apparent example of such calibration can be found in the 
reasoning in Northbuild Construction Pty Ltd v Central Interior Linings Pty Ltd,64 which 
concerned a challenge to a decision of a construction adjudicator.  There was support here 
for a context and statute-specific approach to the meanings of ‘good faith’ and ‘bad faith’.  In 
the leading judgement of White JA, her Honour ultimately preferred to look to what the 
particular Act required of the decision-maker rather than ‘elusive synonyms’, and here it was 
noted particularly that in the relevant context ‘rapid’ decision-making was necessary.65   
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In the context of ‘fraud’, a telling comment is found deep in the important 2007 decision of 
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship:66  
…the present appeal should be resolved after close attention to the nature, scope and 
purpose of the particular system of review by the Tribunal which the Act establishes 
and the place in that system of registered migration agents. Any application of a 
principle that “fraud unravels everything”, requires consideration first of that which is to 
be “unravelled”, and second of what amounts to “fraud” in the particular context. It then 
is necessary to identify the available curial remedy to effect the “unravelling”.    
Other examples  
A similar analysis might be applied to some other interesting agitation and evolution in 
administrative law principles - relating (for example) to delegation and the ground most 
commonly referred to as ‘behest’.  Notable in the former context is the gradual erosion of the 
old Carltona principle that allowed lower governmental officials to act as the ‘alter ego’ of 
senior ones, which has recently been described as being of ‘uncertain’ scope and status in 
Australia.67  Although courts continue to acknowledge that administrative realities require 
some flexibility as regards the rule against delegation,68 in a climate of more detailed decision-
making structures the Carltona principle in its raw form is seen to be less relevant - it has 
become more important to closely examine the scheme and the nature of the responsibility 
conferred on the senior official.69  Indeed the careful inquiry might be directed to which 
components of a function can be handled below.70  And it appears that in some cases, perhaps 
where the administrative ‘necessity’ is less compelling, the courts might look for evidence of a 
clear authorisation – suggesting some return in these cases to a more traditional search for 
an implied power to delegate and evidence of its exercise.71 
One further example illustrates that retrospective analysis of some classic Australian cases 
might reveal a longer-running trend.  In the case of Bread Manufacturers of NSW v Evans72 
(which concerned a challenge to orders of the New South Wales Prices Commission on the 
ground of behest), Mason and Wilson JJ indicated that the extent to which higher views can 
be taken into account and acted upon will depend on circumstances such as the particular 
function and character of the decision maker, the intent of the legislation as to the relationships 
involved, and the nature of the views expressed.73  These comments, alluding in part to the 
possibility of a distinctly variable scale of required independence, appear not to have been 
closely explored in later decisions on this ground.  Yet they are obviously significant in the 
context of this article.  On the facts, Mason and Wilson JJ felt that the Commission could not 
be expected to operate in a vacuum and was therefore free to take advice from others, 
including the Minister (in light of the ministerial veto power).74  They went on to conclude that 
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there was no evidence here that any member of the Commission had forsaken their 
independence.75 
Even this brief and esoteric survey of examples reveals something of a pattern in the evolution 
of Australian administrative law, that it has some deep roots, and that it is continuing to 
influence legal trajectories.  Taking this to its logical end, there is a theoretical possibility that 
our traditional grounds of judicial review will, over time, be dissolved in principles of statutory 
interpretation.76  Yet before we launch into critique, re-enter the theorising of past debates, or 
even just ask ‘how far should this go’, it is important that we look at this pattern from a broader 
perspective – to ensure that we are seeing the whole of the picture.  Do the examples selected 
above truly reflect a consistent pattern of thinking?  Does it have a coherent rationale?  It is 
argued here that in fact this pattern of statutory focus and repatriation of grounds is better 
viewed as part of a larger phenomenon: a natural but conceptually-fraught search for flexibility 
in judicial review principles in response to broadening and diversifying regulatory context, 
evolving legislative drafting, and maturing public expectations and litigation strategy.   
 
Departures from the ‘statutory specifics’ – a search for flexibility? 
A broader analysis reveals, first, that there have been some significant pauses, diversions and 
even retreats in the repatriation of principles sampled above.  In many instances, these saw 
the courts reaching again for deeper external standards or touchstones in the application of 
judicial review doctrines.  In broad terms, the re-furbished but still somewhat opaque 'principle 
of legality' – a presumption against legislative interference with fundamental rights and 
freedoms77 – allows the court to view legislation through a tinted protective lens78 that can be 
difficult for drafters to dislodge.79  Also, the entwined histories of jurisdictional error and 
privative clause construction (some of which was recounted above), illustrates some ongoing 
influence of external standards.  Whilst Hickman may have been firmly returned to the broader 
toolbox of constructional aids, the pre-mixed Craig classifications of jurisdictional error clearly 
linger in contemporary reasoning.80 
More specifically, in the context of the very principles that gave rise to Project Blue Sky, a 
recent case also illustrates the ongoing influence of external standards in an otherwise quite 
exacting statutory interpretation exercise.  In Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson,81 the High 
Court considered the consequences of non-compliance with Western Australian legislation 
requiring mining lease applications to be accompanied by certain operations statements and 
mineralisation reports.82  The joint majority examined the statutory scheme, and carefully 
considered but distinguished Project Blue Sky, in holding that the procedural requirements 
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were ‘essential preliminaries’ to the grant of leases and that the breaches were effectively 
invalidating.83  Notably for present purposes, there was a very conspicuous reliance upon a 
‘line of authority’ establishing that where a statutory regime confers power to grant exclusive 
rights to exploit resources, it will be understood (subject to contrary provision) as ’mandating 
compliance with the requirements of the reqime…’.84  The notable reliance on this precedent, 
obviously external to the specific statutory terms in issue, was clear from the reasoning: 
‘Finally, and importantly, Project Blue Sky was not concerned with a statutory regime for the 
making of grants to exploit the resources of a State’.85  
The history of natural justice (or ‘procedural fairness’) is also instructive in this regard.  Building 
on what has been said already, the context-sensitive ‘spectrum’ approach to bias standards 
appears to be now sharing ground (at least) with a newer methodology of ‘speciation’ – with 
some apparent variation in applicable standards depending on the precise nature of the bias 
alleged.86  Obviously this quite technical speciation of bias is somewhat removed from 
excavations of statutory context and purpose.  More directly, there is a very relevant history to 
the fair hearing rule.  Much of the steam that drove the contemporary statute v common law 
debate was of course generated by Brennan J’s denial (most conspicuously in Kioa v West87) 
of the existence of a ‘free-standing common law right’ to natural justice - and emphasis upon 
the centrality of the statutory construction process.88  His Honour’s particular target in Kioa 
was the situation-specific notion of ‘legitimate expectations’ - which he regarded as being of 
‘uncertain connotation’ and potentially misleading.  He felt that the question of whether natural 
justice applied demanded a ‘universal answer’ for any given statutory power.89  As noted 
earlier, the debate over the source of natural justice obligations90 ultimately stalled amidst 
doubts as to its significance.91  Yet the notion of ‘legitimate expectations’, at least through 
Brennan J’s lens, might now be understood as a failed (lengthy) experiment with external 
circumstantial considerations in the application of judicial review doctrine.92  Ironically 
however, and importantly for present purposes, as will be seen external circumstantial 
considerations do appear to have gained a firm foothold in the fair hearing principles via the 
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requirement of ‘practical injustice’93 – which reaches out into (at least) the question of whether 
in a practical sense a person actually lost an opportunity to make some material submission.94   
Another difficulty with fully embracing the ‘statutory focus’ explanation of Australia’s evolution, 
even putting aside the obvious problem that it has little to offer as regards non-statutory 
powers, is that it is not easy to identify a clear rationale for such an approach.  Certainly at key 
moments the conspicuous emphasis on statutory specifics has lent some democratic and 
constitutional legitimacy, and a sense of neutrality, to the more difficult or controversial judicial 
review decisions.95  Moreover, there has perhaps been some conceptual pull behind the 
spread of this approach.  As the concept of jurisdictional error (in its classification of the gravity 
of error) has become more clearly attached to internal statutory specifics, it might seem to be 
more difficult to sustain freestanding anterior standards of error in the individual grounds.  How 
is an error identified and articulated by reference to external standards accommodated by 
what is becoming a more internally-driven assessment of whether that error is ‘jurisdictional’ 
(when such assessment is required)?  
Yet looking beyond these points of higher principle and theory, close analysis shows that in 
many instances the careful centering of specific statutory context and purpose was part of 
something more pragmatic – ie part of a deft response to the challenges of modern context.  
In the examples of the ‘Blue Sky effect’ noted above, for example, we see careful avoidance 
of an unpalatable wholesale invalidation of a broad regulatory framework;96 simplification of 
an intractably tangled old principle for varied new purposes;97 resurrection of some semblance 
of fairness in the face of a legislative exclusion of natural justice;98 incremental 
acknowledgment of vast differences in decision-making contexts and responsibilities;99 and 
fine-tuning of principle to the complexity of contemporary decision-making hierarchies.100  
There may also be a larger pragmatism at play in this trend.  It must be remembered that 
‘jurisdictional error’ now has a constitutionally privileged place (at both federal and state level).  
The new reality is that some repatriation of old freestanding grounds, and their integration with 
the internally-focussed jurisdictional error principles, is perhaps the best way to preserve the 
underlying standards involved in the face of more legally intrusive legislative prescription.  The 
battles for freestanding common law principles might be sacrificed somewhat in order to win 
a war over the underlying standards of administrative legality.101  
The democratic and constitutional legitimacy advertised by deference to statute has 
undoubtedly been a bonus – particularly given that in some of these cases the courts appeared 
to be excavating deeper statutory intentions to tunnel around specific statutory obstacles.  And 
we can acknowledge that there has perhaps been some conceptual pull in the pattern of 
development.  Yet overall, analysis indicates that the elevated statutory focus might be best 
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understood as a search for greater flexibility in judicial review principles - to accommodate 
significant evolutions in governmental and regulatory context.  It certainly has contributed 
agility to the judicial review exercise – perhaps more than might have seemed possible.  Blue 
Sky itself illustrated that close examination of ‘statutory purposes’ can extend to a frank 
consideration and weighing up of the practical implications of invalidating the disputed 
government action.   
Perhaps then we have tended to miscategorise that true nature of the legal evolution in play.  
The ‘statutory purpose’ theory would seem to tell only part of the story – and imperfectly.  To 
reconceptualise the challenge as a modern search for flexibility, in middle-aged common law 
doctrine, might help us to better understand the legal trajectory, contribute more in our 
commentary to the daily efforts of the courts in meeting the challenge, and more readily spot 
the attendant risks.  Importantly, as explored below, some of the diversions and retreats from 
the statutory focus (discussed above) sit more easily with this broader theory. 
 
Flexibility ‘stage two’ – calibration to consequence  
The search for flexibility appears to have come in two stages.  In the first place, as explained 
above, the courts have instinctively and deftly sought a closer connection to governmental and 
regulatory context – to better respond it seems to change and diversity in the subject matter, 
scope, purposes, style and detail of contemporary regulation.  Much of the contextual change 
is reflected in the relevant decision-making legislation, and can be accessed through a closer 
and more holistic focus on specific statutory purpose and detail.  The key question we are left 
with is does this necessitate a repatriation of all of the remaining freestanding grounds?  The 
second stage of the search for flexibility (and reflexivity) might be best understood as a 
broadening and intensifying judicial focus on the consequences of administrative error – to 
better respond it seems to more complex decision-making contexts, more sophisticated public 
expectations, evolving litigation volumes and strategies, and indeed new executive realities.  
This second search can take the courts some way beyond statutory terms (albeit sometimes 
notionally attributed to presumed statutory intention) – and is in many respects more 
challenging.   
Importantly for present purposes, as alluded to above some of the diversions and retreats from 
the statutory focus might properly be regarded as components of this second stage evolution 
of principle.  This type of flexibility – calibration to consequence – has long had an inchoate 
presence in various corners of judicial review doctrine.  It was present in the reference to 
‘materiality’ included in the template laid out in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend 
Ltd102 for the application of the relevancy/irrelevancy grounds of review.  In the natural justice 
context, it had some influence in the wandering operations of the now discarded notion of 
‘legitimate expectations’, and more clearly in the ‘adverse, credible, relevant and significant’ 
trigger for an obligation to disclose material under fair hearing rules.103  Most importantly, 
calibration to consequence of breach is central to the fair hearing rule requirement of 
procedural ‘practical injustice’ (or ‘actual unfairness’) that emerged from the Lam decision,104 
and indeed to the older Stead inquiry into the possibility of a different substantive outcome but 
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for the natural justice error.105  Conventionally the Lam and Stead ideas were kept relatively 
separate in their operation,106 however very recently there has been some possible 
convergence of the two ideas.107   
Interestingly for present purposes, the calibration to consequence also found its way into the 
application of Project Blue Sky principles.  In the New South Wales decision of Attorney 
General of New South Wales v World Best Holdings Ltd108 Spigelman CJ had identified a 
possible ambiguity in the reasoning of Project Blue Sky - as to whether it is necessary to look 
for a legislative purpose that “any” act done in contravention of the relevant procedural 
stipulation should be invalid, or more specifically, a purpose that “an” act done in contravention 
should be invalid. In his view the latter approach would generally be applicable, in the sense 
that the court must generally examine what the legislature intended in respect of the particular 
breach under consideration.109  This approach appeared to surface in the brief 2009 High 
Court decision of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO.110  There the High Court 
overturned the Full Federal Court’s conclusion111 that a misdirected notice of hearing was 
invalidating despite the attendance in any event of the relevant party.  The High Court 
emphasised that it was necessary to look at the extent and consequences of the particular 
failure (measured here against basic nature justice standards).112   
Obviously in SZIZO there is some draw upon the notion of procedural ‘practical injustice’ (or 
‘actual unfairness’) from the natural justice context.  More importantly however, the natural 
association of the Blue Sky principles with the principles of ‘jurisdictional error’113 made it 
somewhat inevitable that this new attention to (specific) consequences in the former would 
lead to further refinements in the latter.  Indeed this likelihood was nudged along, and possible 
terminology provided, in the 2015 High Court decision of Wei v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection.114  At several points in their judgment Gageler and Keane JJ indicated, 
although it was not significant in this case, that the search was for a ‘material’ breach of the 
imperative requirement identified.115   
Ultimately, in the 2018 jurisdictional error decision of Hossain v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection,116 Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ emphasised that in addition to the 
search for preconditions and conditions (noted above), it was necessary to discern the ‘extent’ 
of non-compliance necessary (ie whether a particular failure was of a magnitude) to take the 
decision outside of jurisdiction.117  Interestingly, as per the specific breach extension of the 
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Blue Sky principles, this calibration to consequence was itself categorised as an exercise in 
statutory construction.118  Their Honours proceeded to state (referring to the Stead cases, the 
Peko Wallsend formulation, and comments in Wei) that a statute is ordinarily to be interpreted 
as incorporating a threshold of ‘materiality’ before denying legal force and effect to a decision 
made in breach of a condition – which ‘ordinarily’ would not be met if compliance could have 
made ‘no difference to the decision in the circumstances in which it was made’.119  Nettle J 
and Edelman J, in separate judgments, were at pains to emphasise that there were exceptions 
to any requirement that an error must be material in this sense before being classified as a 
‘jurisdictional error’.120  
A majority of the High Court (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) confirmed this consequence-
sensitive approach to jurisdictional error in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v 
SZMTA.121  As noted at the outset, this article is not a full discussion and critique of the 
‘materiality’ principle in jurisdictional error doctrine.  However, it is relevant to note that some 
of the conceptual difficulties attending this second stage search for flexibility – the attempt to 
calibrate principles to specific consequence – were aired in Nettle and Gordon JJ’s strong 
dissent on the key issues in SZMTA.  Their Honours considered that the deployment of a 
‘materiality’ inquiry (as part of the identification of jurisdictional error rather than as a function 
of residual remedial discretion122) entailed departure from the statutory construction exercise 
and would lead to uncertainty – as well as involving an inappropriate reversal of the onus in 
the proceedings.123  We are left with at least two critical questions, as regards this stage two 
search for flexibility: at what stage has the court descended too far into the substantive 
reasoning (and hence the task) of the decision maker below; and at what point has the 
objective preventative procedural protection of judicial review standards drifted too far into 
subjective, situation-specific speculation. 
 
Conclusion: implications and theoretical compromise? 
There would seem to be some obvious practical costs attending the evolutions examined in 
this article.  Most simply stated, there is a growing variability in our standards of administrative 
legality.  While that certainly builds agility into these hard-working principles, it is difficult to 
avoid the sense that with each ‘repatriation’ or calibration to specific statutory context, or 
indeed with each deferral to the consequences of breach, there is some incremental loss of 
consistency, predictability and normative influence in Australian administrative law (which in 
turn has potential implications for the quality and perceptions of administrative decision-
making).  This not only might increase litigation (consider the example of the long-calibrated 
‘fair hearing’ rules) but perhaps even runs counter to some basic precepts of the ‘rule of law’ 
in its modern iteration.124  Long-term teachers in the field might be tempted to apply a litmus 
test of ‘teachability’ as they consider the implications of these evolutions.  Practitioners might 
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apply their own test of ‘advisability’ as they consider these developments in the context of their 
clients’ affairs.  And public officials might be considering the accessibility of these principles in 
the context of their own, often broad and under-resourced, responsibilities.125  It seems likely 
that all might anticipate some difficulty in engaging with the increasingly complex interpretive 
and predictive inquiries attending this field of law.  
There are perhaps further difficulties with the evolutions we are witnessing.  Obviously a 
determined calibration to statutory context brings some devaluation and disassembly of the 
common law of Australian public law, and given the sophistication of existing judicial review 
principles there is some artificiality126 in attempting to attribute their complex nuances and 
refinements to statutory design or acknowledgment.  Even if we embrace the old theoretical 
compromise that the legislature, being aware of common law principles, can be presumed to 
have intended them to apply to a power,127 this would seem to (at best) stultify the capacity of 
the principles to continue to develop and (at worst) rest the whole exercise upon an eroding 
and archive of ‘common law principles’.  Another very obvious difficulty with the statutory focus 
is that in the context of non-statutory powers it is at best conspicuously unhelpful, and at worst 
quite corrosive. 
As regards calibration to consequence of breach, while it brings a certain realism to 
contemporary administrative law, even in the early iterations of this methodology the potential 
for overstep has long been a cause for some concern.  Courts have been regularly invited to 
retrospectively ponder procedural hypotheticals (since Lam) and the probabilities of different 
factual findings or outcomes (under the guise of the Stead).  In the context of the new 
‘materiality’ principles attending jurisdictional error, the High Court recently noted and resisted 
(in Nobarani v Moriconte128) a request to conduct a broad hypothetical revisiting of the original 
decision.  More recently, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA,129 the 
majority also noted but worked around the risks - while Nettle and Gordon JJ (in dissent on 
the critical issues) posed the hazard of a drift into ‘merits’ as one of their key objections to the 
superimposition of a requirement of ‘materiality’.130  In the most recent High Court decision 
touching upon the matter, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CED16,131 the High 
Court appeared to avoid the key issue somewhat – emphasising that the ‘appeal can be, and 
is to be, allowed without reference to any issue of materiality’.132  This is oddly reminiscent of 
the tone that signalled a final re-think of the old doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’133 - and 
would appear at least to be an acknowledgment of the lingering difference of judicial opinion, 
and growing controversy, around this notion of ‘materiality’ in jurisdictional error doctrine.  
These dilemmas are not easy to navigate.  As discussed above there are some complex 
structural and theoretical issues in play as regards calibration to statutory context – not least 
the pull exerted by the evolution of jurisdictional error doctrine, and the constitutional place of 
that concept.  And there is also some raw force in play – as regards both calibration to statutory 
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context and calibration to consequence.  Both have been a fixture of the natural justice fair 
hearing rules for some years – and the federal courts in particular have grappled with an 
enormous caseload in that context.  It was perhaps inevitable that there would be some 
permeation of natural justice methodology (albeit awkward and contentious at times) through 
broader judicial review principles. 
However, for the reasons noted immediately above, these evolutions and dilemmas warrant 
close consideration.  Australian administrative law is perhaps is at a new crossroads.  There 
are two theoretical compromises that might help to steady the trajectory of the calibration to 
statutory context.  First, it is important to recall that the first stage reach for flexibility was driven 
particularly by jurisdictional error and the Blue Sky principles.  Many might accept the logic of 
the Blue Sky principles in their own field of operation, and applaud the clarity of a near 
complete shift to the internal ‘essential preconditions’ approach jurisdictional error, and yet 
might be uncomfortable with the broader ‘repatriation’ of grounds that is possibly taking place.  
These mixed feelings might be reconcilable, and justifiable, if it is firmly kept in mind that Blue 
Sky and jurisdictional error principles are both in a sense focused on an assessment of the 
seriousness and appropriate legal result of identified error.  This would seem to be a 
quintessentially technical legal question that the courts might quite appropriately seek to 
answer in a flexible, statute specific (and even somewhat conclusory or instinctive) manner.  
Yet sacrificing the normative influence and predictability of the underlying grounds of review 
that themselves identify error (including for subsequent jurisdictional error assessment) would 
seem to be a different matter.  The remaining free-standing grounds of Australian judicial 
review can quite appropriately be preserved – albeit with the aid of a second theoretical 
compromise of the kind suggested particularly by Gageler J in recent judgments.134  That 
second compromise is that the common law version of these grounds, and their attending 
tests and precedents, can be maintained as clear ‘default’ standards that are applicable 
subject to specific statutory variation.  Predictability, consistency and the normative influence 
of administrative law would be best served by requiring any statutory variation to be clear, 
rather than a product of sophisticated implication.   
With regards to the trend of calibration to consequence, driven largely by the high-volume 
reactive evolutions of natural justice doctrine, the dilemmas are perhaps more intractable.  The 
‘materiality’ iteration of this search for flexibility (in jurisdictional error doctrine) – which in a 
sense gives back to government something of what was taken via the Plaintiff S157 and Kirk 
constitutional entrenchment of jurisdictional error review – is currently the subject of vigorous 
academic discussion.  The best caution that administrative law history offers in this regard is 
that we must be diligent in holding arguments that errors are ‘immaterial’ or inconsequential 
to a strict standard – lest the balance be shifted too far in favour of decision-makers, and the 
boundaries of the courts’ proper role be lost. 
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